Andy
Andriy (Andy) Zapechelnyuk
School of Economics
University of Edinburgh
31 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh EH8 9JT
United Kingdom
Location: 31 Buccleuch Place, Room 4.01
Email: azapech (ατ) gmail.com
Phone: Microsoft Teams
I am a Professor of Economics at the University of Edinburgh. I serve as an Associate Editor for Econometrica and Economic Theory/ETB. My research interests lie in the field of microeconomic theory and applications, focusing on communication and information design, optimal contracts, and robust decision theory.
Short Bio: I got a PhD from Stony Brook University in 2005. Before landing at Edinburgh in 2022, I spent some time as a researcher at the Center for the Study of Rationality (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (University of Bonn), and I have taught at Kyiv School of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, University of Glasgow, and University of St Andrews.
Working Papers
‣ On Monotone Persuasion (with Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li)
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where a posterior distribution over states is summarized by its mean. We identify two settings where the optimal unrestricted signal can be nonmonotone. In the first setting, the optimal unrestricted signal requires randomization. In the second setting, the optimal unrestricted signal entails nonmonotone pooling of states. We solve for the optimal monotone signal in each setting, and illustrate our results with an application to media censorship.
‣ Optimal Inquiry (with Tai-Wei Hu)
A decision maker acquires and processes information about an uncertain state of nature by an inquiry: a contingent sequence of questions to be asked before a decision is reached. Inquiry is a costly activity, with the cost proportional to its length. We characterize optimal inquiries and uncover two behavioral implications associated with costly inquiry: attention span reduction (i.e., favoring shorter inquiries by focusing on a subset of decisions and assigning them different priorities) and confirmation bias (i.e., seeking evidence through inquiry to confirm a prior guess of which decisions are optimal). This framework can be used to understand prominent cognitive biases, such as framing and search satisficing in healthcare and tunnel vision in criminal investigation.
‣ Disclosure in insurance markets with limited screening (with Dimitri Migrow)
We investigate the impact of information disclosure, via a statistical instrument, on consumer welfare in competitive insurance markets with limited screening. We demonstrate that, under natural constraints on information disclosure, no statistical instrument is "safe" to implement. There always exists an open set of prior beliefs about the risk types of consumers, compatible with the currently observed market allocation, under which additional information disclosure strictly worsens welfare.
‣ Fair hiring procedures (with Karl Schlag)
We conceptualize what it means for job applicants to be treated fairly during the hiring. Two principles are postulated within a model of sequential search: equal treatment of equals and no rejections by chance. Fair procedures are fully characterized. Accordingly, applicants need to be shortlisted and interviewed in a random order. Moreover, job offers need to be made either on the spot or only after interviewing all applicants on the shortlist. Fair hiring procedures are easy to monitor. To avoid misuse, we advocate that before starting the interviews, the shortlist and hiring criteria must be preregistered with a regulator.
‣ Persuasion under insufficient reason (with Anton Kolotilin) [Slides]
‣ Bargaining under incomplete information with the help of delay (with Karl Schlag)
‣ Competing e-commerce intermediaries (with Alexander Matros)
Publications
Econometrica (forthcoming)
‣ Are there "Ratatouille" restaurants? On anticorrelation of food quality and hygiene
(with Hisayuki Yoshimoto)
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (forthcoming) [Open Access]
‣ Compromise, don't optimize: Generalizing perfect Bayesian equilibrium to allow for ambiguity
Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics 2 (2024), 77-128.
‣ Constructive vs toxic argumentation in debates
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 16 (2024), 262–292
[merges two earlier working papers, A model of debates: Moderation vs free speech and Sequential obfuscation and toxic argumentation]
‣ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
Economic Theory 76 (2023), 1051-1067 [doi] [Open Access]
‣ Censorship as optimal persuasion
(with Anton Kolotilin and Tymofiy Mylovanov)
Theoretical Economics 17 (2022), 561-585 [Open Access]
(with Karl Schlag)
Theoretical Economics 16 (2021), 1431-1470 [Open Access]
[an earlier working paper version is here]
‣ Bayesian persuasion and information design: Perspectives and open issues
Introduction to the Special Issue on Communication and Persuasion
(with Emir Kamenica and Kyungmin Kim)
Economic Theory 72 (2021), 701-704 [doi]
‣ Optimal quality certification
American Economic Review: Insights 2 (2020), 161-176 [doi]
‣ Job search costs and incentives
(with Ro'i Zultan)
Economic Theory Bulletin 8 (2020), 181-202 [doi]
‣ Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
(with Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, and Ming Li)
Econometrica 85 (2017), 1949-1964 [doi]
‣ Optimal allocation with ex-post verification and limited penalties
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
American Economic Review 107 (2017), 2666-2694 [doi] [Online Appendix]
[earlier versions titled "Optimality of non-competitive allocation rules" and "Value of competition in allocation and search problems"]
(with Karl Schlag)
Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017), 145-169 [doi]
[an earlier version titled “Decision making in environments without priors”]
‣ An axiomatization of multiple-choice test scoring
Economics Letters 132 (2015), 24-27 [doi]
‣ Eliciting information from a committee
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 2049-2067 [doi]
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
International Economic Review 54 (2013), 769-785 [doi]
‣ No-regret dynamics and fictitious play
(with Yannick Viossat)
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013), 825-842 [doi]
‣ Decision rules revealing commonly known events
(with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
Economics Letters 119 (2013), 8-10 [doi]
‣ On the impossibility of achieving no regrets in repeated games
(with Karl Schlag)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81 (2012), 153-158 [doi]
‣ Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
(with Alexander Matros)
International Journal of Industrial Organization 29 (2011), 426-431 [doi]
‣ Bargaining with a property rights owner
(with Yair Tauman)
Games and Economic Behavior 70 (2010), 132-145 [doi]
‣ On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions
(with Yair Tauman)
International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010), 171-175 [doi]
‣ Better-reply dynamics with bounded recall
Mathematics of Operations Research 33 (2008), 869-879 [doi]
‣ Optimal fees in internet auctions
(with Alexander Matros)
Review of Economic Design 12 (2008), 155-163 [doi]
‣ Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
(with Pradeep Dubey and Ori Haimanko)
Games and Economic Behavior 54 (2006), 77-94 [doi]
Grants and Sponsored Events
‣ Project: Theoretical Foundations and Design of Persuasion Mechanisms (2017–2020)
Funded by Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)
Research Team:
‣ Event: An online Inaugral Lecture on "Economics of Persuasion and Strategic Information Manipulation" (2021)
Organized by the University of St Andrews
‣ Event: Seminar Series on Communication and Persuasion (2020)
Sponsored by Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)
Co-organisers:
‣ Event: Workshop on Political Economy, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow (2015)
Sponsored by Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (United Kingdom)
Co-organisers:
‣ Project: Agent-based Simulation of the Wholesale Electricity Market of Ukraine (2007–2009)
Funded by International Development Research Centre (Canada)
Research Team:
Teaching
ECNM11023 Microeconomics 1 (Part B)
‣ Textbooks:
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) “Microeconomic Theory”.
Gibbons (1992) “Game Theory for Applied Economists”